Note; Once again this was originally a reddit post. I did some minor edits on it.
I will be examining two arguments from the YouTuber, Apologetics squared (Henceforth AS). The first, will be a Pascalian argument for the claim that Atheists ought to delete their YouTube channels. The second, will be a more recent argument presented on Capturing Christianity, for the claim that one cannot deconvert from Christian Theism on pain of irrationality. It is recommended that you watch both video's before reading this post. So, let's get started!
Squared's Wager
In the first video linked above, AS presents an argument for the claim that atheists should delete their channels. In the description, he gives the following formulation;
1. If something changes the probability that a person will receive X utility from p_1 to p_2, then the average amount of utility that thing gives them is (p_2-p_1)(X)
2. Def; The probability that a Christian will receive infinite utility is p_C.
3. Def; The probability that an Atheist will receive infinite utility is p_A.
4. p_C is greater than p_A by a non-infinitesimal amount.
5. Therefore, if something changes a person from a Christian to an Atheist, then the average amount of utility it gives them is negative infinity.
6. Counter-apologetics YouTube channels tend to change people from Christians to Atheists.
7. If a person is able to destroy something which tends to give people an average of negative infinite utility, then they are obligated to destroy it.
8. Counter-apologists can destroy their Counter-apologetics YouTube channels by deleting them.
9. Therefore, counter-apologists are obligated to delete their YouTube channels.
What should we make of this argument? There are several possible objections.
We might object to premise 4 on the grounds that for atheists, even for agnostics, the probability of Christianity is 0 or atleast so infinitesimally small that it cannot have an advantage over alternative views. Why? For one, Christianity entails Anselmian theism. The objective probability of Anselmian theism is either going to be 1 or 0, since God is either metaphysically necessary or impossible. So on atheism then, the objective probability of God existing is 0. Now, at this point AS might claim that he is talking about epistemic probability, not objective probability. Still, it seems to follow that the degree to which it seems to us possible that God does not exist, which by the atheists lights should be extraordinarily high indeed - is going to be identical to the degree to which we are warranted in believing that, necessarily, God does not exist. Even if the theist wants to take a much less popular view and (following, say, Richard Swinburne) take God to be a contingent being, an atheist might be convinced by a-priori arguments for the impossibility of such a theism, such as the ones I've defended here and here and many others. If even one of those arguments are sound, we can be close enough to certain that theism qua omni-properties is false. (Related, here is leading atheist philosopher Graham Oppy on why the epistemic probability of theism approximates to 0)
For two, we can look at some teachings which are specific to Christianity, which appears to lay out a very radical anthropology and epistemology. For instance, on Christianity;
i. The Bible teaches no falsehoods.
ii. The universe sufficiently evinces God in His artistic beauty to all mankind. (Psalm 19)
iii. All men truly know God in their hearts and suppress the truth. (Romans 1: 18)
iv. Life is meaningless outside of faith in God. (Ecclesiastes 1-2)
In other words, if Christianity is true, then it's doctrine of revelation is true, which entails that everyone knows God necessarily, that the universe and all of our experiences are God-revealing, and that all of our joy, desires, passions, and love is pointless in the absence of faith. So if you, say, genuinely take yourself to be agnostic - to not know that God exists, then it seems by your lights Christianity must be false. If you reflect on your experiences and genuinely take them as empty of the presence of God or empty of any recognizable divine presence then this entails, by your lights, that Christianity is false. If you think your life, and your practices have value despite you not having faith in God, then once again, by your lights, Christianity is false. None of these points will be convincing to the Christian, of course, but it does mean that, practically speaking, if you are an atheist, or even an agnostic - it seems that the epistemic probability of Christianity is 0 or at least very very close to 0. Thus, premise 4 is probably false.
There is yet another way to attack premise 4. We might say that the probability of;
a. There is a God who rewards believers in Christianity with eternal bliss and punishes those who fail to believe in Christianity with eternal torment.
Relative to a set of alternatives such as;
b. There is a God who already decided prior to creation who He wants to reward or punish.
c. There is a Christian-hating God who punishes all believers in Christianity with eternal torment and rewards everyone else with eternal bliss.
d. There is a universalist God who will reward everyone with eternal bliss no matter what.
e. There is a Devil who will punish everyone with eternal torment no matter what.
-is completely inscrutable. So that we simply cannot know whether it is more probable that deconverting Christians take their chances to achieve infinite utility and avoid infinite disutility away or whether it is in-fact increasing their chance to achieve infinite utility and avoid infinite disutility. Or, whether our actions don't matter at all with respect to who will be receiving infinite utility or infinite disutility, which means we might as well encourage people to cultivate intellectual virtues and believe what we think is true in this life. At the very least, AS has given no argument why we shouldn't think the probability that (a) is true relative to the probability that one of the conjuncts of (b-e) is true is inscrutable. Indeed by my lights, these possibilities do indeed seem equiprobable if not completely inscrutable. Thus, premise 4 is unjustified and likely false.
The argument can also be attacked at premise 7. Premise 7 assumes that we always ought to maximize expected utility and minimize expected disutility. However, there are cases where this turns out to violate our intuitions. For example, suppose we have to go through one of two doors d1 and d2. If I go through d1 there is a 99.99999% probability I will be viciously tortured in horrific ways for a very large but finite amount of time say, googolplex years, and a 0.000001% probability I will experience infinite pleasure. On the other hand, if I go through d2 there is a 0.000001% chance I will be tortured for an infinite amount of time, and a 99.99999% chance I will experience extreme pleasure for a very large albeit finite amount of time. It seems overwhelmingly obvious that I should pick d2, but on the principle that we ought to maximize expected utility and minimize expected disutility, I ought to pick d1, as the potential utility I on average get is infinite, whereas with d2 the potential disutility I on average get is infinite. Thus, premise 7 is false.
AS has made a video response to Rationality Rules where he attempts to address this objection. His response is that given some evolutionary debunking argument, we have a reason to think our intuition in this case is unreliable. There are a couple points to make here. For one, we can use evolutionary debunking arguments to undermine the reliability of our intuitions in general, but the justification of all arguments seems to ultimately harken back to intuition, so there might be a looming global skepticism worry. For two, he gives no reason to think that such evolutionary debunking considerations do not just as well count against the Pascalian intuition which motivates the argument - that we should always maximize expected utility. Since after-all, both intuitions regard what we ought to do in cases involving infinite utility. AS needs to provide a principled reason why we should accept the principle of maximizing expected value in this case, where it seems to clearly get it wrong.
I conclude that Squared's Wager is unsound.
Is deconversion from Christianity irrational?
In the second video, AS presents an argument for the claim that Christians can never rationally deconvert from Christianity because given that you accept Christianity, you must accept that your greatest obligation entails always believing Christianity is true. As far as I can tell, there is no precise formulation of the argument to be found, so I made my best attempt at a reconstruction of what I take to be his argument (The formal structure may not be perfect, but leave me alone);
1. There are categorical moral and epistemic norms.
2. There are cases where our categorical epistemic norms and our categorical moral norms conflict, and one will outweigh the other.
3. If (1) and (2) then we always ought to obey what is our outweighing norm.
4. Therefore we always ought to obey what is our outweighing norm.
5. There is a greatest norm that outweighs all other epistemic and moral norms.
6. If you accept Christianity, then the greatest norm that outweighs all other epistemic and moral norms is to fulfill your love to God, which entails having the belief that Christianity is true.
7. Therefore if you accept Christianity, you always ought to believe Christianity is true
Before I respond to this argument. It is important that I clarify a couple distinctions. First, moral norms vs epistemic norms.
What is a norm? A norm is a rule you ought to obey.
A moral norm then, is going to be a rule guiding how you ought to act, or what you ought to do in a given situation. Some easy examples are.
"You ought not torture babies for fun"
"You ought to save a drowning child if you are able with no great risk"
An epistemic norm is a rule guiding your acquisition of beliefs. Here are some examples.
Consistency; You cannot believe p and not-p.
Evidence; If some belief p concerns a fact about which it is easy to acquire evidence, believe p iff one has stronger evidence for p than for not-p.
Next, hypothetical norms vs categorical norms.
A hypothetical norm is a norm that is conditional upon a desire, or a goal. For example, given that it is your goal to lose weight, then you ought to go on a diet or exercise.
A categorical norm, by contrast, is a norm that is not conditional upon a goal or a desire, but is rather reason-giving in itself. For example, we might think "You ought not murder" is a categorical norm, it holds regardless of whatever goals or desires you have.
So, why do I think AS's argument needs premise 1? The answer is I take it that his argument cannot be using mere hypothetical norms, otherwise all he's argued is that it would be irrational for Christians to deconvert given that it is their strongest desire/goal to remain a Christian or something such like. But that's not interesting at all, it certainly does not entail that you can't rationally deconvert as a Christian if you change your mind and begin to lack that desire/goal, so clearly that can't be what he's saying.
But now, we come to the arguments first obstacle, the moral anti-realist and epistemic anti-realist is going to reject premise 1. An error theorist for example is going to think all categorical moral/epistemic norms are false, an expressivist will think that moral/epistemic norms express non-cognitivist attitudes which are not truth-apt. So, on their view there is no categorical normativity. Sadly, AS provides no argument against moral or epistemic anti-realism, thus his argument as it stands simply begs the question against those views.
But let's now assume epistemic realism and moral realism are true. Does premise 2 fare any better? Recall that an epistemic norm is strictly belief-guiding, and a moral norm is strictly action-guiding. How then, can a non-belief guiding norm count against a belief-guiding norm or vise versa? AS runs a thought experiment, which he got from the contemporary Pascalian philosopher Liz Jackson. It goes like this; Suppose there is a truth-hating mafia who kidnaps your family, and they tell you that they'll torture and kill your family unless you take a pill which will force you to believe the millionth digit of pi is 7 (It's not). Thus, we have a case where epistemic norms and moral norms weigh against eachother. But is that really so?
Consider; there are 2 separate oughts here, how you ought to respond to the situation with your direct actions, and what beliefs you ought to have. How you ought to respond to the situation with your direct actions will be 'covered' so to speak, by moral facts, and what your beliefs ought to be will be covered by epistemic facts. In this case, you both ought to take the pill given that is what moral norms command of you, and you ought not believe the millionth digit of pi is 7 given that is what epistemic norms command of you. The moral norm does not weigh against the epistemic norm, your moral duty to take the pill does not change what beliefs you ought to have all-things-considered. All that's happening is that you would be succeeding with respect to your moral duties, and failing with respect to your epistemic duties (because of the pill). Further, the epistemic norm itself does not in any way weigh against you taking the pill, epistemic norms are silent on what actions you ought to take. As they only tell you what your beliefs, and belief-forming methods should be. In-fact, if it is a true moral fact that you ought to take the pill, then according to epistemic norms you ought to believe you ought to take the pill. At best we might say that there is a pro-tanto reason to act in such a way to maximize your disposition for true beliefs and minimize your disposition for false beliefs. But that is not a conflict between bare epistemic norms and moral norms, it should be no surprise that moral norms override weaker pro-tanto reasons.
Moving on to premises 5-7. AS provides another thought experiment to illustrate what he means here. Suppose we have a person, Jim, and he believes that it is his greatest obligation to believe what is written on a piece of paper. You can give Jim a bunch of arguments and evidence to think it is false that what's written on the paper is his greatest obligation, but Jim cannot rationally be compelled by those reasons, since you would just be appealing to lesser epistemic norms. But, his greatest obligation which is to believe what is written on the paper, outweighs them. AS calls beliefs of this kind "anchor beliefs" and, he goes on to say, Christianity is such an anchor belief. Thus, Christians cannot be rational in deconverting from Christianity even on the basis of irrefutable evidence and argumentation that Christianity is false.
There are a few things that can be said here. The first is that there doesn't seem to be any reason to accept premise 5, even if we grant all the previous premises. It may be that there are infinitely many ways categorical epistemic and moral norms can outweigh eachother, and yet there is no single greatest norm which outweighs all other norms. AS has made no attempt to rule such a possibility out after-all. However, the problem gets much deeper. It seems premise 5 is both incoherent given a fairly standard conceptual analysis of categorical epistemic norms, as well as self-undermining. It is incoherent because, by definition, categorical epistemic norms just are those norms which are inherently overriding when it comes to belief-forming. They cannot be outweighed, to say they can is just to misunderstand the overriding normative force that is constitutive of them. AS tries to motivate the claim that epistemic norms can be overridden with Dr. Jackson's truth-hating mob thought experiment, but as we have seen, the motivation doesn't work. To see why it is self-undermining let's look back at AS's 'Jim' thought experiment. Jim believes that what is written on the paper is his greatest obligation. Presumably, this is so because he takes it to be true that his greatest obligation is to believe what's written on the paper. But wait, why does Jim think that it being true that his greatest obligation is to believe what is written on the paper, is a good reason to believe what is written on the paper? The answer it seems to me, is because Jim acknowledges that it is an epistemic norm that we should believe what we think is true. So Jim himself must acknowledge that he is justified in believing his greatest obligation is to believe what's written on the paper, to the same degree that he is justified in holding that it is an overriding epistemic norm that he should believe what is true, and that it is in-fact true that he ought to believe what's written on the paper. Or at the very least, that he has good reasons to think it is true. So, if it turns out there aren't any good reasons to think it is true that his greatest obligation is to believe what is written on the paper and there are good reasons to think it is false, he must acknowledge that he should correct his beliefs.
Another example, how did Jim come to the conclusion that he ought to believe his obligation to believe what is written on the paper outweighs all his epistemic obligations? Perhaps he reasoned like this;
1.My greatest obligation is to believe what is written on this paper
2. Since it is my greatest obligation it must override all other obligations
3. Epistemic obligations are a type of obligation
4. Therefore my greatest obligation to believe what is written on this paper overrides epistemic obligations.
But, why does he believe he ought to think that the premises in the above argument entail the conclusion? Presumably, it is because he takes it to be an epistemic norm that we ought to follow deductive validity, and proper rules of inference. But then, it turns out he is justified in believing his greatest obligation outweighs all epistemic norms, only to the degree that he presupposes the epistemic norm that he ought to obey proper inference rules. So, if he now wants to say that he can ignore his epistemic norms because his greatest obligation overrides them, he would be throwing away the proverbial ladder he climbed to get where he is in the first place. Thus, for the above reasons, premise 5 is incoherent, and self-undermining.
I conclude that AS's argument against rational deconversion from Christianity, is unsound.
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