"God allows creatures, whom He loves, to imperfectly contribute towards the conditions of the world, so as to provide those creatures the opportunity to help bring about the ideal world God would like to create. God certainly could have created this ideal world all on His own, without any sort of contribution on our part, but instead He decided to allow creatures to share in the glory of bringing it about. But, of course in order for them to do so, those creatures would have to first exist within a non-ideal world. The sort of world where things do not go ideally, yet. But, the suffering and evils which do occur can nonetheless be used by God to causally contribute towards the wonderful world this world could eventually become, through the help of God, who works all things together for the good."
I will now consider another, novel objection, a dilemma, afflicting the participation theodicy, one which I had yet to consider in my theodicy blogpost.
I will now consider another, novel objection, a dilemma, afflicting the participation theodicy, one which I had yet to consider in my theodicy blogpost.
The Dilemma
The theodicy, crucially, assumes that creaturely participation is a good, indeed such a great good that it outweighs the good of having an ideal world from the outset. However, this raises the question, would not have it been better for God to have actualized a state of affairs where creatures participate in the creation of an ideal world, and it's being the case that we already arrived at an ideal world through such creaturely participation, as opposed to it's being the case that we only later arrive at an ideal world? There are two answers to this question and both are problematic.
Suppose the answer is that it would be better to have an ideal world arrived at through creaturely participation now, in that case the theodicy fails to answer the problem of evil, for the straightforward reason that we have not arrived at an ideal world yet, and we have the question of why God didn't actualize a world where we arrived at an ideal world now rather than later. If God could have created such a world, and such a world would have been better, than the fact that we aren't in such a world serves as evidence against theism. Furthermore, if we grant that it would have been better for us to have arrived at an ideal world now, then it seems we should also grant that it would have been better to arrive at an ideal world slightly earlier. For surely if it's better to have an ideal world now, than there's no reason to think we'd be missing out on goods if we have an ideal world slightly earlier. But this leads to a problem, for surely this same point applies to all points in which we could have arrived at an ideal world, so for every point in which we have creaturely participation towards an ideal world, it would seem we would have no principled reason to think it wouldn't be better to already have an ideal world at that point. But this severely undercuts any force the participation theodicy could have in principle, as for any non-ideal world we could observe or find ourselves in, we would have more reason to think it would be better if it was an ideal world.
Suppose it's not the case that it would be better to arrive at an ideal world now rather than later. What could be the motivation for this? Surely, it must be for the reason that the good of creaturely participation in the actualization of an ideal world, being exemplified for a longer duration of time is such that it outweighs the good of arriving at an ideal world now. But then you run into a very similar problem. For any given point in time, t, at which an ideal world could have been arrived at, the same motivation for thinking it would not have been better to arrive at an ideal world now, would equally be a motivation to think it wouldn't be better to arrive at an ideal world at t, rather than having more creaturely participation towards the actualization of an ideal world at t. This same motivation, would apply to t+1, t+2, and so on. But then, this seems to suggest that there is no point at which it would be better to have arrived at an ideal world, rather than to have more creaturely participation in it's actualization. For any point, it would be better to have more creaturely participation. But that's an absurd result, for surely it is better for an ideal world to be arrived at eventually, for that is the very thing the creaturely participation is aimed at, the creation of an ideal world. And it in general seems clearly morally absurd to say it is better that we never arrive at an ideal world. That just seems to not take seriously the concept of what an "ideal world" is.
The theist, of course, can object that there is some point at which it would be better to arrive at an ideal world. Perhaps it may not be known what that point is, but there is some point nonetheless. But again, the difficulty is in providing a principled motivation for thinking there is such a point where it would be better to arrive at an ideal world not indefinitely stretched into the future that would not be a reason to think that it would be better to have an ideal world now, which of course would be a disaster for the theodicy. I am not confident in the prospects of such a principled motivation, which is yet another reason, in addition to reasons I've already provided on my blogpost, that I strongly doubt that the participation theodicy is a successful one.
Suppose the answer is that it would be better to have an ideal world arrived at through creaturely participation now, in that case the theodicy fails to answer the problem of evil, for the straightforward reason that we have not arrived at an ideal world yet, and we have the question of why God didn't actualize a world where we arrived at an ideal world now rather than later. If God could have created such a world, and such a world would have been better, than the fact that we aren't in such a world serves as evidence against theism. Furthermore, if we grant that it would have been better for us to have arrived at an ideal world now, then it seems we should also grant that it would have been better to arrive at an ideal world slightly earlier. For surely if it's better to have an ideal world now, than there's no reason to think we'd be missing out on goods if we have an ideal world slightly earlier. But this leads to a problem, for surely this same point applies to all points in which we could have arrived at an ideal world, so for every point in which we have creaturely participation towards an ideal world, it would seem we would have no principled reason to think it wouldn't be better to already have an ideal world at that point. But this severely undercuts any force the participation theodicy could have in principle, as for any non-ideal world we could observe or find ourselves in, we would have more reason to think it would be better if it was an ideal world.
Suppose it's not the case that it would be better to arrive at an ideal world now rather than later. What could be the motivation for this? Surely, it must be for the reason that the good of creaturely participation in the actualization of an ideal world, being exemplified for a longer duration of time is such that it outweighs the good of arriving at an ideal world now. But then you run into a very similar problem. For any given point in time, t, at which an ideal world could have been arrived at, the same motivation for thinking it would not have been better to arrive at an ideal world now, would equally be a motivation to think it wouldn't be better to arrive at an ideal world at t, rather than having more creaturely participation towards the actualization of an ideal world at t. This same motivation, would apply to t+1, t+2, and so on. But then, this seems to suggest that there is no point at which it would be better to have arrived at an ideal world, rather than to have more creaturely participation in it's actualization. For any point, it would be better to have more creaturely participation. But that's an absurd result, for surely it is better for an ideal world to be arrived at eventually, for that is the very thing the creaturely participation is aimed at, the creation of an ideal world. And it in general seems clearly morally absurd to say it is better that we never arrive at an ideal world. That just seems to not take seriously the concept of what an "ideal world" is.
The theist, of course, can object that there is some point at which it would be better to arrive at an ideal world. Perhaps it may not be known what that point is, but there is some point nonetheless. But again, the difficulty is in providing a principled motivation for thinking there is such a point where it would be better to arrive at an ideal world not indefinitely stretched into the future that would not be a reason to think that it would be better to have an ideal world now, which of course would be a disaster for the theodicy. I am not confident in the prospects of such a principled motivation, which is yet another reason, in addition to reasons I've already provided on my blogpost, that I strongly doubt that the participation theodicy is a successful one.
